Labor Hoarding Contracts and Coordination Fictions by JACQUET, Nicolas L. & TAN, Serene
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
4-2008
Labor Hoarding Contracts and Coordination
Fictions
Nicolas L. JACQUET
Singapore Management University, njacquet@smu.edu.sg
Serene TAN
National University of Singapore
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Labor Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
JACQUET, Nicolas L. and TAN, Serene. Labor Hoarding Contracts and Coordination Fictions. (2008). 1-41. Research Collection
School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1091
Labor Hoarding Contracts with Coordination Frictions∗
Nicolas Jacquet
Singapore Management University
Serene Tan
National University of Singapore
April 2008
Abstract
This paper considers a directed search model with risk-neutral firms and
risk-averse workers. Although each firm has only one job to fill, firms can hire
as many workers as they wish, and the wage a worker is paid can be contingent
on the queue length at the firm and his position in the queue. We first show
that, contrary to standard directed search models, the application subgame
does not necessarily have a unique symmetric solution; although uniqueness
is guaranteed if all firms post Flat-Wage Contracts (FWCs), i.e., contracts
where firms commit to employ a fixed number of workers at a fixed wage. We
then show that there is a unique equilibrium such that the expected utility
of having applied to a firm is either decreasing or increasing everywhere in
the number of applicants for all firms, and it is an equilibrium where all firms
post FWCs such that employment is guaranteed to all workers. Compared to
standard directed models where firms post one vacancy, workers are better oﬀ
and firms worse oﬀ: although a firm can reduce its wage bill by insuring workers
through guaranteeing employment, when all firms do so the additional number
of vacancies posted increases competition among firms. In fact, in equilibrium
workers are paid a perfectly competitive wage, even when the economy is finite,
whereas this outcome cannot be achieved without labor hoarding contracts,
even in a large economy.
JEL Codes: D40; J41; J60.
Keywords: Directed Search; Labor hoarding; Vacancies; Risk Sharing; Com-
petition.
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1 Introduction
The directed search approach to modelling markets where trade is decentralized, like
the labor market and some goods markets, has becoming popular in recent years.1
One reason is that, although in such models the market structure is not perfectly
competitive in that firms seeking to hire workers (sellers seeking to attract buyers)
are not price takers, firms (sellers), contrary to random search models, compete
directly with each other on price. This is because workers (buyers) observe all wages
(prices) or price mechanisms oﬀered, oﬀers that firms (sellers) are committed to, and
workers (buyers) can therefore direct their search towards the firm (seller) oﬀering
them the highest expected payoﬀ.2 But coordination frictions limit the extent of
competition since workers (sellers) cannot be guaranteed employment (delivery of
the good) at their preferred firm (seller), and therefore firms (sellers) do not face a
perfectly elastic labor supply (demand for the good). Hence, prices play a better
allocative role than that in the random search framework.3
In standard directed search models, in the labor market context, a firm can
make itself more attractive to workers by increasing the wage it posts. A higher
wage implies workers will apply to this firm with a greater probability, implying
that the probability the firm receives no applicant decreases. But the probability a
given worker is chosen for the job decreases, and hence, there is a trade-oﬀ between
the wage and the probability of employment at a given firm for workers, while there
is a trade-oﬀ between profit net of the wage and the probability of filling the job for
firms. These trade-oﬀs are unavoidable in standard directed search models because
firms have only one tool at their disposal, the wage they post, since an applicant’s
probability of employment is implicitly determined by the wage.
There are two important assumptions that are maintained throughout these
studies: firms cannot compensate the unlucky workers who have shown up but are
not awarded the job; and all agents are risk-neutral. The aim of this paper is to
1A non-exhaustive of list of papers includes Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991, 1997, 2000),
McAfee (1993), Burdett, Shi and Wright (2000), Julien et al. (2000, 2007), Shi (2001, 2005), and
Shimer (2004).
2 In random search models, if past oﬀers can be recalled or on-the-job search is allowed, two or
more firms (sellers) can compete directly with each other for a worker (buyer). However, this is true
for only some of the meetings, and because search is still random prices do not play as important
an allocative role as they do in directed search models.
3See for instance Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) for a comparison of the eﬃciency properties of
the allocation under diﬀerent mechanisms.
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relax these two assumptions, which we believe is particularly relevant for the study
of the labor market. Assuming that firms cannot compensate workers who have
applied but are not chosen to fill the job is clearly restrictive.4 In fact, even if a
firm has only one job to fill, it could rationally decide to commit to hoard labor
in some cases. There at least two reasons why a firm might want to do so. First,
by posting a contract where it can choose both the wage(s) and the number of
vacancies, the firm breaks, at least partially, the tight link between the wage posted
and the probability with which a given worker will be employed. This is particularly
relevant when workers are risk-averse since they are eager to avoid unemployment.
By posting a contract where it commits to hoard labor, a firm should therefore be
able to oﬀer workers a lower expected wage than otherwise, and it might thereby be
able to reduce its expected wage bill despite expecting to hire more than one worker
with positive probability.
More specifically, we study a directed search model of the labor market which is
standard in all but two respects: we assume that workers are risk-averse, and firms
are free to post any employment contract they want. That is, a firm can hire as many
workers as it wants, despite having one productive job, and the wage paid can be
contingent both on the number of workers applying and the position of the worker
in the queue. We first show that, contrary to standard models, there might not
be a unique symmetric equilibrium of the application subgame. This multiplicity
can arise when labor hoarding is allowed because workers’ payoﬀs are no longer
necessarily monotonic in the probability with which other workers apply to a firm.
But if all firms post Flat-Wage Contracts, FWCs hereafter, that is, contracts where
the wage is not contingent on the number of workers applying, then the equilibrium
is unique.
When then show that there is a unique equilibrium such that the expected
utility of having applied to a firm is either decreasing or increasing everywhere in
the number of applicants for all firms, and it is a FWC-equilibrium where all firms
guarantee employment to all workers. Although this result might seem intuitive
with risk averse workers because of the wage bill argument of Akerlof and Miyazaki
(1980), the result is actually not trivial in a directed search framework because of
the existence of coordination frictions.
4 It is also restrictive in a goods market since sellers could choose to pay a fee to all buyers who
show up at their store. For instance, Faig and Huangfu (2007), in a competitive search model of
money, allow marketmakers to pay some agents to come to their markets, and they show that, in
equilibrium, marketmakers will indeed choose to pay a fee to some agents.
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The welfare implications of labor hoarding contracts can seem surprising: when
the number of firm is exogenous, it turns out that workers are strictly better oﬀ
than if firms post standard wage contracts, whereas firms are strictly worse oﬀ.
How can firms be worse oﬀ when oﬀering labor hoarding contracts to risk-averse
workers since such contracts should intuitively lower the expected wage bill each
firm has to pay because of implicit risk-premium levied on workers’ wages? The
reason lies in the greater competition that arises among firms when labor hoarding
contracts are posted. In fact, the insurance element enables a firm, taking as given
the contract posted by other firms, to decrease its expected wage bill compared to
the standard directed search model. But when all firms do the same, competition
is strengthened, thereby reducing firms’ expected profits.
When hoarding labor is allowed, the equilibrium wage paid by all firms is equal
to the expected marginal productivity of a worker, and is therefore equal to the
perfectly competitive wage. Hence, despite the fact that the market is decentralized,
workers’ utility level is the same as if the labor market was perfectly competitive,
even for a finite economy. This contrasts with standard directed search models
where agents’ payoﬀs only converge to those obtained in a perfectly competitive
economy as the economy becomes large, and only in the case of risk-neutral workers.
Although firms are not price takers, they are too small to have any impact on the
expected utility of applying to other firms, and therefore all firms then take as given
the expected utility they have to oﬀer to workers. In that case the markets are, in
essence, complete, and the equilibrium is therefore eﬃcient.5
When workers are risk-averse in a standard directed search model with wage
posting, the expected wage is below the value of a worker’s expected marginal pro-
ductivity, even in a large economy. Further, because employment is not guaranteed,
workers’ expected utility is reduced further compared to the equilibrium with hoard-
ing. The fact that the expected wage is below the perfectly competitive wage can
be explained as follows: when workers are risk-averse the probability with which
they apply to a firm is less responsive to a reduction in the wage the firm oﬀers
than for risk-neutral workers. This is because risk-averse workers are more willing
to accept a reduction in wage in exchange for a greater probability of employment
5 In directed search models with multiple applications (see Albrecht et al., 2007; and Galenianos
and Kircher, 2007), the equilibrium is ineﬃcient. This is because in these models vacancies that
have made oﬀers to workers who reject them, because they have another better oﬀer, are not allowed
to make subsequent oﬀers to their other applicants. Kircher (2007) shows that eﬃciency can be
obtained if a market for such unfilled vacancies exists.
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than risk-neutral workers. Hence, although markets are incomplete6 when workers
are risk-averse, firms can complete the markets by oﬀering labor hoarding contracts.
This paper is closely related to the literature on decentralized trade investigating
the choice of mechanism by firms (sellers), either in a random search (Delacroix and
Camera, 2004) or directed search framework (McAfee, 1993; Peters, 1997; Coles
and Eeckhout, 2003; Michelacci and Suarez, 2006). But all these studies share the
assumptions that all agents are risk-neutral and the firm (seller) cannot compensate
the worker (buyers) who are not awarded the job (good).
A branch of the literature also closely related to our work is interested in whether
the equilibrium outcome in decentralized exchange converges to the competitive out-
come, again both in random (Rubinstein andWolinsky, 1985, 1990; Gale, 1986, 1987;
Binmore and Herrero, 1988) and directed search frameworks (Peters, 1991, 1997,
2000; McAfee, 1993). In these papers, if the outcome can be perfectly competitive
it is only asymptotically - as agents become infinitely patient for random search
models, and as the economy becomes large in the directed search ones, whereas in
our model labor hoarding contracts result in a perfectly competitive outcome even
for a finite economy.
The implicit contract literature (Baily, 1974; Azariadis, 1975; Polemarchakis,
1979; Akerlof and Miyazaki, 1980) is also interested in risk-neutral firms insuring
risk-averse workers. And as highlighted by Holmstrom (1983) and Kihlstrom and
Laﬀont (1983) the implicit contracts oﬀered by firms to workers complete the mar-
kets, exactly as labor hoarding contracts do in our model. However, the implicit
contract literature considers frictionless environments where the insurance firms pro-
vide workers with is an insurance related to a common risk: the state of the world,
and therefore the productivity of each firm, is ex ante uncertain. In this literature,
it is the introduction of implicit contracts that can lead to the existence of unem-
ployment since with spot markets no worker is unemployed and the risk workers
face is coming from the fluctuation in the wage. In our model firms insure workers
against the risk of unemployment, which exists without labor hoarding contracts,
and unemployment risk is faced only by workers.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in the next section,
and the application subgame is considered in section 3. Section 4 characterizes
6Markets are incomplete without labor hoarding contracts because risk-averse workers care about
more than just the expected wage they will receive, they also care about the probability of being
employed or unemployed.
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the equilibrium of the model. The welfare implications of labor hoarding contracts
are studied in section 5, and section 6 deals with the eﬃciency properties of the
equilibrium. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
There are M identical firms, all profit maximizing and risk neutral, indexed by
m ∈ {1, ...,M}, and N identical risk-averse workers indexed by n ∈ {1, ..., N}. Each
firm has one job, and if the job is filled, the product to be split is 1. If the job
is unfilled, the firm is idle and nothing is produced. A firm m posts a contract
wm = (w
r,k
m )
N,N
r=1,k=1, where w
r,k
m is the wage paid to the rth worker (in the queue)
when k workers have applied to firm m. Since all applications are received at the
same time and all workers are identical to a firm, it is assumed that firms treat
workers identically so that the position of a worker in the queue is determined
randomly. Hence, when a worker applies to firm m and k − 1 other workers have
also applied to the same firm, he is assigned to each position in the line with equal
probability 1/k. We also assume, without loss of generality, that wr,k = 0 for all
r > k. We restrict ourselves to non-negative wages, and since in equilibrium a firm
will never post a wage greater than the product of a match, for otherwise they would
make negative expected profits, we know that wages are bounded above by 1. When
firm m posts the wage contract wm and k ≥ 1 workers have applied, its profit is
πk(wm) = 1−W k (wm) , (1)
where W k (wm) ≡
Pk
r=1w
r,k
m is the wage bill. It is assumed that firms are owned
by entrepreneurs with deep pockets so that no restrictions are put on the size of the
wage bill, and in particular firms are allowed to make negative profits ex-post.
Each worker makes one application. When a worker is employed at wage w his
utility is u(w) where u is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable with u(0) = 0. We also assume that the utility of unemployment is
zero. Combined, these two assumptions implicitly imply that there is no disutility
from working.7 We assume, for simplicity, that when facing the choice of being
employed at a zero wage or being unemployed, two options that yield the same
payoﬀs, a worker chooses to work.
7Section 6 considers the case where workers value leisure.
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The game is a one-shot, two-stage game. In the first stage, firms simultaneously
decide the contract they each want to post, and this announcement, which firms
are committed to, is publicly observable. In the second stage, once workers have
observed the posting of all firms, they choose their application strategy, and we
denote by θn,m ∈ [0, 1] the probability that worker n applies to firm m. As men-
tioned earlier, since all applications are received at the same time and all workers
are identical to the firm, the position of the worker in the queue is determined ran-
domly. Ultimately our goal is to study the existence of labor hoarding contracts in
a large, but not necessarily limit, economy, and in this case the anonymity assump-
tion seems natural. Moreover, as Peters (1997) argues,8 a symmetric equilibrium
has the desirable property that the probability with which a deviating firm is chosen
depends smoothly on the contract its oﬀers whereas in when coordination is allowed
this is not necessarily the case. We therefore maintain this assumption throughout
the paper.
If we denote by W = {(wr,k)N,Nr=1,k=1| wr,k ∈ [0, 1] and wr,k = 0 for all r > k}
the set of wage contracts, and we restrict ourselves to the case where firms use pure
strategies, an equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 1 A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile ((wm)Mm=1, (θn)
N
n=1), where
wm is the posting strategy of firm m and θn = (θn,m)Mm=1 is the application strategy
of worker n, such that:
(i) Given w ≡ (wm)Mm=1, θ ≡ (θn)Nn=1 is the Nash equilibrium in the application
subgame; and
(ii) Given θ ≡ (θn)Nn=1 in the subgame, with θn (w) :WN → SM , w ≡ (wm)Mm=1 is
the Nash equilibrium in the contract-posting game, where SM is theM− dimensional
simplex.
This problem is a two-stage game, and we solve it by backward induction. We
first look at the application subgame in section 3, then we solve for equilibrium in
section 4, while Section 5 considers welfare and eﬃciency. Section 6 concludes.
3 The Application Subgame
Let us consider the problem of worker n. When firms’ posting strategy profile is w,
and given that all other workers’ application strategy profile is θ−n ≡ (θi)i6=n, the
8See pages 103-4.
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expected utility of worker n in applying to firm m is independent of the probability
with which other workers apply to other firms, and is given by
Un,m
¡
wm;θ−n,m
¢
=
N−1X
k=0
pkN−1 (θ−n,m)u
e(wk+1m ), (2)
where θ−n,m is the vector of application probabilities to firm m by all other workers;
pkN−1 (θ−n,m) is the probability that k other workers, out of the remaining N − 1
workers, apply to firm m when other workers’ application strategy profile is θ−n;
and
ue(wk+1m ) =
1
k + 1
k+1X
r=1
u(wr,k+1m ) (3)
is the expected utility of having applied to firmm when k other workers have applied
to that same firm, with wk+1m denoting the vector of wages paid by the firm when
k + 1 workers have shown up.
There is one type of contract which is of particular interest. They are such that
wr,k = w for all (r, k), r ≤ k ≤ v, for some number v ≤ n. That is, a firm commits
to hire a number v of workers at wage w, and w is not contigent on the number of
workers who have applied to the firm. We call such contracts flat-wage contracts,
FWC(s) hereafter. Since in these contracts firms are de facto posting a fixed number
v of vacancies with a fixed wage w, we denote a FWC by w(v) = w ·1N,N (v), where
1N,N (v) is the matrix of dimension (N,N) filled with ones in its min{k, v} first
lines for column k, k = 1, ..., N , and zeros elsewhere. If firm m posts a FWC w(v),
the expression for Un,m
¡
wm;θ−n,m
¢
simplifies to
Un,m
¡
w(v);θ−n,m
¢
= Ω (θ−n,m; v)u(w), (4)
where
Ω (θ−n,m; v) ≡
N−1X
k=0
pkN−1 (θ−n,m)
min{k + 1, v}
k + 1
(5)
is the probability to be hired by firmm, conditional on having applied, when it posts
v vacancies and other workers’ application strategy profile is θ−n. Naturally, when
a firm posts v = N vacancies, all workers applying to it will end up being employed
so that Ω (θ−n,m;N) = 1 and the expected utility of applying to that firm is equal
to the utility of being employed at the wage it posted.
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The equilibrium probability of application to firm m for worker n must be such
that
θn,m =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 , if Un,m
¡
wm;θ−n,m
¢
< Maxj 6=m Un,j
¡
wj ;θ−n,j
¢
;
1 , if Un,m
¡
wm;θ−n,m
¢
> Maxj 6=m Un,j
¡
wj ;θ−n,j
¢
; and
[0, 1] , if Un,m
¡
wm;θ−n,m
¢
=Maxj 6=m Un,j
¡
wj ;θ−n,j
¢
,
and
PM
m=1 θn,m = 1. We will be focusing on equilibria where workers use symmetric
application strategies. In this case, θi = θj , for all pairs of workers (i, j), and to
save on notation we denote by θ =(θ1, ..., θM) their common application strategy
where θm is the application probability to firm m. When workers use symmetric
application strategies, pkN (θ) is simply given by the standard binomial expression
pkN (θ) = C
k
Nθ
k (1− θ)N−k . (6)
Furthermore, the probability of being employed by a firm, conditional on having
applied, when all other workers apply to that same firm with probability θ is given
by (5) where the vector of application strategies θ−n,m is replaced by θ. This way,
(5) can be rewritten as
Ω (θ; v) =
Γ (θ; v)
Nθ
, (7)
where
Γ (θ; v) ≡
vX
k=0
kpkN (θ) + v
Ã
NX
k=v+1
pkN (θ)
!
(8)
is the expected number of workers that the firm will be hiring. This is intuitive:
θΩ (θ; v) is the unconditional probability for a worker to be employed by the firm,
which implies that NθΩ (θ; v) = Γ (θ; v) is the expected number of hires for a firm
who is applied to with probability θ; and Γ (θ; v) is given by (8) since if k ≤ v
workers apply all get hired, whereas if k > v apply only v will be employed. It is
proved in the appendix that Γ (θ; v), and therefore Ω (θ; v), increases with v.
Hence, the application profile θ = (θ1, ..., θM) is a Nash equilibrium in symmetric
visit strategies if and only if for all m ∈ {1, ...M},
θm =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 , if Um (wm;θm) < Maxj 6=m Uj (wj ;θj) ;
1 , if Um (wm;θm) > Maxj 6=m Uj (wj ;θj) ; and
[0, 1] , if Um (wm;θm) =Maxj 6=m Uj (wj ;θj) ,
(10)
and
PM
m=1 θm = 1.
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We further assume that when two firms m and j post contracts wm and wj ,
respectively, such that ue(wkm) = ue(wkj ) for all k, i.e., the expected utility of
having applied to both firms, conditional on the same number of workers having
shown up, is the same for all possible queue lengths, then workers treat both firms
symmetrically by applying to each of them with the same probability. Although
this anonymity assumption is not in general innocuous, it turns out that it does not
matter for the main results of the paper. Hence, since it simplifies the presentation
and derivation of some of the results, we will maintain this assumption and we will
point out the instances where it matters.
Proposition 1 (i) For all wage posting strategy profiles w a Nash equilibrium in
symmetric visit strategies exists.
(ii) Furthermore, if for all m, ue(wkm) ≥ (≤)ue(wk+1m ) for all k,
then the equilibrium is unique.
Proof. In the appendix.
In standard directed search models wage contracts posted by all firms are FWCs
with 1 vacancy, i.e., for all m wm(1) = wm · 1N,N (1). Hence, U (wm(1);θm) =
Ω (θm; 1)u(wm), and the expected utility of applying to firm m, is such that
∂U (wm(1);θm)
∂θm
=
∂Ω (θm; 1)
∂θm
u(wm) < 0,
which is intuitive since as θ increases the competition for the vacancy posted by the
firm increases, and therefore Ω (θm; 1), the probability of being employed conditional
on having applied, decreases. Here is the intuition why the application subgame has
a unique equilibrium: if we assume that both θ and eθ are equilibria of the application
subgame of the standard directed search model, take any two firms m and j such
that θm > eθm ≥ 0 and eθj > θj ≥ 0. Since ∂Ω (θ; 1) /∂θ < 0,
U(wm(1);eθm) > U (wm(1);θm) ≥ U (wj(1);θj) > U(wj(1);eθj),
which contradicts the fact that eθj > 0. It is clear that the uniqueness of equilibrium
is guaranteed by the fact that the probability of employment at a each firm strictly,
and therefore the expected utility oﬀered by each firm, strictly decreases with the
probability the firm is applied is applied to.
In this paper firms are allowed to post any contract, and in this case
∂U (wm;θm)
∂θm
=
N−1X
k=0
kpkN−1 (θm)
θm
h
ue(wk+1m )− ue(wkm)
i
.
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When the contracts posted are such that for all firms m, ue(wkm) ≥ ue(wk+1m ) for
all k, and ue(wkm) > ue(wk+1m ) for some k, then the expected utility of applying
to each firm is also strictly decreasing in the probability of application, exactly
as in the one vacancy case. However, it turns out that if there is a unique firm,
say firm i, for which ue(wki ) = u
e(wk+1i ) for all k, i.e., the payoﬀs of applying to
firm i are independent of the number of workers applying, then the equilibrium is
still unique. This reasoning can then be used to see, as proposition 1 establishes,
that with anonymity, as long as the expected payoﬀs of applying to all firms are
either all weakly decreasing or all weakly increasing in the number k of workers
who show up, then the equilibrium is unique. This is because if two firms m and
i oﬀer contracts that are such that for all k ue(wkm) = ue(wk+1m ) = ue(wm) and
ue(wki ) = u
e(wk+1i ) = u
e(wi), then if ue(wkm) < (>)ue(wki ) no worker will ever
apply to firm m (i), and if ue(wkm) = ue(wki ), then by anonymity all workers will
apply to both firms with the same probability (which might be zero). Therefore,
anonymity implies that all firms posting contracts whose payoﬀs are independent of
the number of workers applying, and which are applied to in equilibrium, can all be
treated symmetrically.
Corollary 1 If all firms post FWCs, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
in symmetric application strategies.
Proof. If all firms post 1 vacancy, then ue(wkm) > ue(wk+1m ) for k ≥ 1; if all
firms post FWCs with 1 < v ≤ N −1 vacancies, then for all m, ue(wkm) = ue(wk+1m )
for all k ≤ v − 1 and ue(wkm) > ue(wk+1m ) for k > v − 1, and if v = N then
ue(wkm) = ue(wk+1m ) for all k ≤ N − 1, then the result then follows from proposition
1.
It is worth highlighting that without the anonymity assumption regarding the
way workers treat firms for their application strategies, the conditions that guarantee
uniqueness in proposition 1 and corollary 1 would be more stringent. If we consider
corollary 1 (the same reasoning applies to proposition 1), the condition to be satisfied
to guarantee uniqueness would be that there must be at most one firm posting a
FWC with N vacancies, because otherwise there would be a continuum of equilibria.
In fact, consider such a posting profile with two firmsm and i posting FWCs with N
vacancies and the same wage w. If θ, one equilibrium of the application subgame, is
such that θm ≥ 0 and θi ≥ 0 with θm+θi > 0, then, defining θ as the sum of θm and
θi, it follows that any eθ such that eθm+eθi = θ and eθj = θj for all j 6= m, i is also an
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equilibrium. This is because the expected utility of applying to firms posting FWCs
with N vacancies is independent of the probability with which other workers apply
to these firms since ue(wkm(N)) = u(wm) for all k. Hence, it appears that when
more than one firm post FWCs with N vacancies anonymity conveniently rules out
all but one equilibrium, which eliminates indeterminacy issues. Note, however, that
all these equilibria are payoﬀ-equivalent for workers.
Even with anonymity, uniqueness cannot be guaranteed when firms post non-
FWCs. To illustrate this, let us consider a specific economy with two firms and
three workers, and consider worker 1. When the two other workers apply to firm 1
with probability θ1, the expected utility of workers in applying to firms 1 and 2 are
respectively
U1 (w1;θ1) = (1− θ1)2 ue
¡
w11
¢
+ 2θ1 (1− θ1)ue
¡
w21
¢
+ θ21u
e ¡w31¢ , and (11)
U2 (w1;θ1) = θ21u
e ¡w12¢+ 2θ1 (1− θ1)ue ¡w22¢+ (1− θ1)2 ue ¡w32¢ .
It is clear that if ue
¡
w11
¢
= ue
¡
w32
¢
, ue
¡
w21
¢
= ue
¡
w22
¢
and ue
¡
w31
¢
= ue
¡
w12
¢
,
then U1 (w1;θ1) = U2 (w1;θ1) for all θ1 ∈ [0, 1]. This is because in this case the
wage contracts posted by the two firms are such that no matter what applica-
tion strategy two of the three workers choose, the third worker is indiﬀerent be-
tween applying to either firms: ue
¡
w11
¢
= ue
¡
w32
¢
implies that if the two other
workers apply to firm 2, then worker 1 is indiﬀerent between applying to firm
1 or 2, and so on. In the case of such contract postings any θ1 ∈ [0, 1] is a
symmetric equilibrium of the application subgame, and all equilibria are payoﬀ-
equivalent for the workers. This type of multiplicity does not exist in standard
directed search models because in these models firms are restricted to posting
FWCs with 1 vacancy. Thus, when both firms post FWCs with 1 vacancy we
have that ue
¡
w11
¢
= u(w1) > ue
¡
w21
¢
= u(w1)/2 > ue
¡
w31
¢
= u(w1)/3 and
ue
¡
w32
¢
= u(w2)/3 < ue
¡
w22
¢
= u(w2)/2 < ue
¡
w12
¢
= u(w2), and therefore it is not
possible to have ue
¡
w11
¢
= ue
¡
w32
¢
, ue
¡
w21
¢
= ue
¡
w22
¢
and ue
¡
w31
¢
= ue
¡
w12
¢
.
There is another type of situation in which multiplicity of equilibria can be
obtained with general contracts, but do not exist in standard directed search models.
Focusing on interior solutions, workers apply to firms 1 and 2 with some positive
probability if and only if U1 (w1;θ1) = U2 (w1;θ1), that is, subtracting U2 (w1;θ1)
from U1 (w1;θ1) as given in (11), if and only if
θ21 ×
£¡
ue
¡
w11
¢
+ ue
¡
w31
¢
− 2ue
¡
w21
¢¢
−
¡
ue
¡
w12
¢
+ ue
¡
w32
¢
− 2ue
¡
w22
¢¢¤
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+θ1 × 2
£¡
ue
¡
w21
¢
− ue
¡
w11
¢¢
−
¡
ue
¡
w22
¢
− ue
¡
w32
¢¢¤
+
£
ue
¡
w11
¢
− ue
¡
w32
¢¤
= 0
(12)
Given the posting profile w, this is an equation of the second degree in θ1, which
can therefore have 0, 1 or 2 solutions. Note that since θ1 is the probability with
which workers apply to firm 1, the only relevant root(s) are the one(s) whose value
is between 0 and 1. Assume, for simplicity, that ue
¡
w11
¢
= ue
¡
w32
¢
so that (12)
simplifies to
θ1
©£¡
ue
¡
w31
¢
− 2ue
¡
w21
¢¢
−
¡
ue
¡
w12
¢
− 2ue
¡
w22
¢¢¤× θ1 + 2 £ue ¡w21¢− ue ¡w22¢¤ª = 0.
In this case the two solutions to this equation are θ1 = 0 and
eθ1 = 2 £ue ¡w22¢− ue ¡w21¢¤¡ue ¡w31¢− ue ¡w12¢¢+ 2 ¡ue ¡w22¢− ue ¡w21¢¢ .
It is clear that if ue
¡
w22
¢
> ue
¡
w21
¢
and ue
¡
w31
¢
> ue
¡
w21
¢
, then eθ1 ∈ (0, 1),
which shows that with non-FWCs it is possible to have multiple equilibria for the
application subgame.
When all firms post FWCs with 1 vacancy, equation (12) can be rewritten as
θ21 ×
µ
u(w1)− u(w2)
3
¶
− θ1 ×
µ
3u(w1) + u(w2)
3
¶
+ (u(w1)− u(w2)) = 0 (13)
In the appendix it is shown that although this equation in θ1 can have two solutions,
there is at most one of them whose value is between zero and one, which confirms the
result that in standard directed search models there is a unique symmetric solution
to the application subgame. With more general contracts, firms can post wages that
are contingent on the number of workers who applied, and the additional degrees of
freedom that this gives to firms compared to the one-vacancy model make it possible
to find more than one solution to equation (2) with values between zero and one.9
9More generally, when there areM firms and N workers, the expected utility of applying to firm
m is
Um (wm;θm) =
N−1[
k=0
pkN−1 (θm)u
e

wk+1m

.
Hence, assuming an interior solution, the expected utility of applying to any two firms m and i is
the same so that we have that θ is such that Um (wm;θm) = Ui (wi;θi) for all (m, i), implying that
for all (m, i)
N−1[
k=0
pkN−1 (θm)u
e

wk+1m

=
N−1[
k=0
pkN−1 (θi)u
e

wk+1i

.
Hence, taking firm M as the reference, we have that θ =

θ1,θ2, ...,1−
SM−1
m=1 θm

and therefore
the vector of dimension M − 1 (θ1,θ2, ...,θM−1) is the solution to the system of (M − 1) polynomial
equations of degree N .
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4 Equilibrium
In this section we first look into the optimal contract posting decision of a firm
before showing the existence and uniqueness of what we call a FWC-equilibrium.
4.1 A Firm’s Posting Decision
Firm m’s expected profit when it posts wm and it is applied to with probability θ is
Π(wm; θ) =
NX
k=1
pkN (θ)π
k(wm), (14)
where πk(wm) is given by (1). It is clear that, conditional on k workers applying,
the composition of the firm’s wage bill W km(wm) does not matter for the firm. But
intuitively, it does matter for workers because they are risk averse.
Lemma 1 For all w−m the best-response of firm m is to post a contract wm such
that wr,km = wkm for all r ≤ k.
Proof. Consider a contract wm such that for some k w
r,k
m 6= wp,km , for r, p ≤ k. If
instead firm m were to post the contract ewm such that for some k, ewr,kjm = ewkm for all
r ≤ k, and such that u( ewkm) = ue(wkm), then the firm oﬀers to the workers the same
conditional expected utility of applying for the two contracts. And by oﬀering ewm
instead of wm it reduces its wage bill when k workers show up to W km(ewm) = k ewkm,
and therefore πk(ewm) > πk(wm). In fact, the strict concavity of u yields that
W km(wm)−W km(ewm) = kX
r=1
wr,km − ku−1
"
1
k
kX
r=1
u(wr,km )
#
> 0.
Furthermore, for all k ue(ewm) = ue(wkm), and therefore the equilibrium applica-
tion strategy profiles of the application subgame implied by w =(wm,w−m) andew=(ewm,w−m) are the same, and we denote them by θ1, ..., θL, L ≥ 1.10 Hence,
since for all l = 1, ..., L, Π(ewm; θlm) > Π(wm; θlm) it is a best-response to other firm
posting w−m for firm m to post a contract such that w
r,k
m = wkm for all r ≤ k.
The intuition for the result is that since workers are risk averse, when a firm
lowers the variability of the payoﬀs associated with the employment contract it is
posting, risk-averse workers value this decreased variability. This then enables the
10This is true because we assume anonymity.
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firm to reduce its expected wage bill by reducing the expected wage promised in its
contract for each possible number of workers showing up, k. But since for each pos-
sible number of workers applying the firm oﬀers the same expected utility, workers
apply to the firm with the same probability, which means the firm’s expected profit
has increased for each possible equilibrium probability of the application subgame.
With this intuition in mind it is tempting to draw as a conclusion that a firm
maximizes its profit if and only if it posts a FWC with N vacancies. However,
there are two subtleties, one related to the possibility of multiple solutions to the
application subgame and the other related to the issue of how firms posting the same
contracts are treated, which imply that it is not necessarily the case that posting a
FWC with N vacancies is the best-reponse to other firms’ postings. The following
lemma gives suﬃcient conditions under which posting a FWC with N vacancies is
indeed the best-reponse.
Lemma 2 If w−m is such that for all firms i 6= m, ue(wki ) ≥ (≤)ue(wk+1i ) for all
k, with ue(wki ) > (<)u
e(wk+1i ) for some k, then the best-response for firm m is to
post a FWC with N vacancies.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The reason why it might not be a best-reponse, even weak, for a firm to post a
FWC if other firms’ contract posting profile w−m is such that for some i, ue(wki ) >
ue(wk+1i ) for some k and u
e(wk
0
i ) < u
e(wk
0+1
i ) for some k
0 is as follows. In this
situation there might be more than one equilibrium strategy profile associated with
a wage contract posting wm for firmm, no matter whether firmm posts a FWC. Let
us suppose, without loss of generality, that when firmm posts the contractwm which
is not a FWC with N vacancies, it induces two possible application strategy profiles
θ and eθ such that θm 6= eθm. If firm m could choose which of the two application
probabilities workers will use, it is true that for each of these application profiles
the firm could do better by posting a flat-wage contract: either wm or ewm such
that U (wm;θm) = U (wm;θm) and U(ewm;eθm) = U(wm;eθm), depending on whether
it wishes to receive applications with probability θm or eθm. In fact, for each of
the two application strategy profiles, firm m can reduce the variability in payoﬀs
of applying to it by posting FWCs. And since workers are risk averse, FWCs that
deliver the same expected utility as with wm imply lower expected wage bills for
the firm, and therefore Π(wm | θm) > Π(wm | θm) and Π(ewm | eθm) > Π(wm | eθm).
However, given that w−m is such that for some i, ue(wki ) > u
e(wk+1i ) for some
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k and ue(wk
0
i ) < u
e(wk
0+1
i ) for some k
0, there can be more than one equilibrium
application strategy profile associated with firm m posting wm. If there are two
equilibrium application profiles θ and bθ in this case, although we know for sure that
Π(wm | θ) > Π(wm | θ), it is not possible to rule out that Π(wm | θ) > Π(wm | bθ).
Hence, if firmm were to change its contract posting from wm to wm, it would gain if
workers were to apply according to θ, but it would be worse oﬀ if they were to apply
according to bθ. And the same applies for the contract posting ewm. Hence, in this
case it is not necessarily the case the switching to a FWC is profitable, which means
that posting a FWC is not necessarily a best-response to other firms’ postings.
If instead w−m is such that there exists at least one firm i for which ue(wki ) =
ue(wk+1i ) for all k, whether or not it is a FWC, and all other firms j diﬀerent from
i and m post contracts such that ue(wkj ) ≥ ue(wk+1j ) for all k, with ue(wkj ) >
ue(wk+1j ) for some k, then posting a FWC with N vacancies is not necessarily the
best-response for firm m either. Assume, without loss of generality, that there is a
unique firm i which posts a contractwi such that ue(wki ) = u
e(wk+1i ) = u(wi) for all
k. Then U(wi; θi) is independent of the probability with which other workers apply
to firm i, and let us denote it by U i. Hence, if firmm posts a FWC with N vacancies
and wage w such that u(w) < U i, then no worker applies to firm m, in which case
its expected profit is zero. If instead, it chooses a wage w such that u(w) ≥ U i,
then workers might apply. In particular, if u(w) = U i, then workers are indiﬀerent
between applying to firms m and i, and in this case, by anonymity, workers apply
to both firms with the same probability. Hence, given w−m and that firm m posts a
FWC wm(N)=u−1
¡
U i
¢ ·1N,N (N), firmmwillbeappliedtowithsomeprobability, sayeθ.
Assume that eθ > 0. Then, if wm is such that u(wm) = U i + ,  > 0 arbitrarily
small, by continuity of workers’ application strategies in firms’ wage postings, firm
m is applied to with probability θ = 2eθ + η, η > 0 small.
We can represent graphically how firm m’s expected profit varies with the wage
posted. Firmm’s expected profit is zero for all wm < u−1
¡
U i
¢
, and if wm = u−1
¡
U i
¢
then expected profits are given by Π(wm(N);eθ). If firm m instead posts a FWC
such that u(wm) = U i + ,  > 0 arbitrarily small, then there are two cases to
consider. In the first case, depicted in figure 1, when firm m posts a FWC with
a wage that exceeds what firm i oﬀers its expected profit jumps to a level greater
than Π(wm(N);eθ), it continues to increase as wm increases up to ew, beyond which
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expected profits decline.11 It is also possible to represent how the expected profit
of firm m varies with θ, as is done in panel b of figure 1: the firm is applied to with
probability
θm =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 , if wm < u−1
¡
U i
¢
;eθ , if wm = u−1 ¡U i¢ ;
θm (wm(N);w−m) > 2eθ , if wm > u−1 ¡U i¢ ,
where θm (wm(N);w−m) is the equilibrium application probability for firm m for
the unique equilibrium application profile θ (wm(N);w−m) for wm > u−1
¡
U i
¢
. Note
that θm (wm(N);w−m) increases with wm,12 and reaches 1 for some wage less than
1. In this first case, posting a FWC with N vacancies with wage ew is for firm m a
best-response to other firms posting w−m. In the second case, which is depicted in
figure 2, when firm m posts a FWC with a wage that exceeds what firm i oﬀers, its
expected profits jump to a level lower than Π(wm(N);eθ), and then it decrease as
wm increases.13 On panel b of figure 2 we can see how in this case expected profits
for firm m vary with θm.
From the graphical representation of firm m’s profits as a function of the appli-
cation probability θm, one can see that a firm’s profit maximization problem can
either be thought of as choosing the wage contract to post, or as first choosing the
best contract to post for each possible probability of application, and then the firm
chooses the probability with which it wants workers to apply. This second way of
thinking about a firm’s maximization problem makes it clear what are the poten-
tial problems for firm m to choose a FWC with N vacancies: firm m cannot freely
choose the application probability. In fact, θm is limited to be either 0, eθ or a value
between (2eθ, 1]. For the first case discussed above, this is not a problem since the
application probability choice for a FWC with N vacancies is in the range of values
that firm m can choose from. But for the second case this is not true anymore. Now
suppose that instead of posting a FWC with N vacancies, firm m were to post a
FWC with (N − 1) vacancies. With this posting the application probability θm is
11Profits when wm = 1 will be negative because this is the highest possible wage a firm can
oﬀer, and firm m guarantees employment, whereas other firms do not, implying the contract firm
m oﬀers strictly dominates all other firms’ oﬀers. Hence, firm m’s expected profits are in this case
1− n× 1 = −(n− 1) < 0.
12As firm m increases its wage, it becomes more attractive to workers and therefore they will
apply to firm m with a (weakly) greater probability.
13 If Profits are lower than Π(wm(N);hθ) the same result can be obtained. What is important is
that profits fall for all θ < eθ for some eθ < θ.
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such that
θm =
(
0, if wm < bw (w−m) ;
θm (wm(N − 1);w−m) , if wm > bw (w−m) ,
where bw (w−m) > u−1¡U i¢ is the minimum wage firm m must post if it wants
workers to apply given that other firms’ postings are given byw−m. Clearly firmm is
not minimizing its wage bill for θm ∈ (2eθ, 1] as figure 3 suggests: the expected profit
function for v = N − 1 is in red whereas the blue line still represents the expected
profit for v = N . But by posting a FWC withN−1 vacancies it can indirectly choose
the probability with which workers apply. In the first case discussed above, since a
FWC with N − 1 vacancies delivers lower expected profits than the best FWC with
N vacancies for all values of θ - see figure 3, this is true at θm ( ew · 1N,N (N);w−m)
and as mentioned above this is not a problem in this case that firm m is restricted
in its choice of application probability. But in the second case (see figure 4), it is
possible that the maximum expected profits that firm m can achieve by posting
a FWC with N − 1 vacancies exceeds what it can obtain when posting a FWC
with N vacancies because in this former case it can freely choose the probability of
application workers will use.14
Corollary 2 If all i 6= m, wi = wi · 1N,N (vi) with vi < N , then the best-response
for firm m is to post a FWC with N vacancies.
4.2 FWC-Equilibrium
In this section we characterize equilibria where all firms post FWCs, which we call
FWC-equilibria. From corollary 2 in the previous section we know that if all firms
except one firm, say firm m, post FWCs with less than N vacancies, then firm m’s
best-response is to post a FWC with N vacancies. This implies that in a FWC-
equilibrium there must be at least one firm posting N vacancies. It turns out that
the unique FWC-equilibrium is such that all firms post N vacancies.
Proposition 2 In an economy with N workers and M firms, there is a unique
FWC-equilibrium. It is such that all firms post N vacancies at wage
w∗N,M [N ] =
µ
1− 1
M
¶N−1
, (15)
14 In this case anonymity is where the problem is originating from for FWC with N vacancies.
However, it can be shown that when anonymity is assumed away, another (bigger) problem arises:
a firm still cannot (indirectly) choose the application probability which results in indeterminacy.
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and workers apply to each firm with probability 1/M .
Proof. In the Appendix.
The intuition for the result is as follows. First, it follows from lemma 2 that a
FWC-equilibrium must be such that at least one firm posts N vacancies, since oth-
erwise firms would have an incentive to deviate and post a FWC with N vacancies.
And if all other firms post the FWC w(N) = w ·1N,N (N), then when firm m posts a
FWC at wage wm it will be applied to with probability 0 if wm < w, 1/M if wm = w
and 1 if wm > w. But if firm m instead chooses to post an almost-FWC that ap-
proximates the FWC w(N) = w ·1N,N (N), it can choose the probability with which
workers will apply. In fact, by posting a contract for which there is some variability
in workers’ payoﬀs, the firm makes the expected utility of applying dependent on the
probability with which other workers apply. For instance, a firm can post a contract
that pays w to all workers who have applied when at most N−1 did apply and such
that u(w) = u(w) + , for  > 0 arbitrarily small, and that pays w to all workers
when all N workers have applied and such that u(w) = u(w)− δ, for δ > 0 arbitrar-
ily small. When other workers apply to this firm with probability θ the probability
that the N −1 other workers have applied is θN−1, and the probability that at most
N − 2 other workers have applied is 1− θN−1, and therefore the expected utility of
applying to a firm posting such a contract is θN−1u(w)+(1− θN−1)u(w). It is clear
that for each pair (w,w) there is a unique θ ∈ [0, 1] such that
θN−1u(w) + (1− θN−1)u(w) = u(w), (16)
and therefore for all θ ∈ [0, 1] a firm can induce workers to apply to it with this
probability by posting a pair (w,w) satisfying (16) for the desired θ. In particular,
if we denote by θ∗(w) the probability with which a firm would like workers to apply
given that all other firms post the FWC w(N) = w · 1N,N (N), a firm can indeed
induce workers to apply with probability θ∗(w) by posting a contract ew(N) such
that the two wages satisfy (16) for θ = θ∗(w). Naturally, risk-averse workers must
be compensated for any additional variability in payoﬀs arising from the existence
of two possible wages compared to the contract oﬀering w(N). Hence, the expected
wage bill associated with the contract posting ew(N) exceeds the expected wage bill
for w(N). However, for a small enough variation in the two wages w and w the extra
cost compared to the full FWC in terms of the wage bill is small, so that posting an
almost FWC is more profitable than posting w(N). From here one can intuit that
if the probability θ∗(w) that maximizes a firm’s expected profit when posting the
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FWC with N vacancies and with wage w is equal to 1/M , then no firm wants to
deviate and post an almost-FWC. Therefore, a firm’s best-response in this case is to
post the same FWC as other firms. And for any other candidate FWC-equilibrium
there is at least one firm which has a profitable deviation by posting either a FWC
or an almost-FWC.
Hence, in equilibrium all workers are employed. This is reminiscent of the im-
plicit contract literature (see for instance Azariadis, 1975). However, in the implicit
contract literature firms are insuring workers against wage fluctuations due to fluc-
tuations in the level of economic activity whereas in our model firms insure workers
against the risk of unemployment in an environment without shocks.15
Payoﬀs in the Finite Economy Case. Workers expected utility in this case
is simply
U∗N,M [N ] = u
"µ
1− 1
M
¶N−1#
. (17)
A firm’s expected profit is given by (14) for wm = w∗N,M [N ] = w
∗
N,M [N ] · 1N,N (N),
with
πk(w∗N,M [N ]) = 1− kw∗N,M .
Replacing w∗N,M [N ] by its expression in (15), we have that
Π∗N,M [N ] =
NX
k=1
pkN
µ
1
M
¶Ã
1− k
µ
1− 1
M
¶N−1!
,
which simplifies to16
Π∗N,M [N ] = 1−
µ
1− 1
M
¶N
− N
M
µ
1− 1
M
¶N−1
. (18)
15The result in the implicit literature that delivers employment fluctuations is due to some re-
strictive assumptions (see Akerlof and Miyazaki, 1980).
16This because
N[
k=1
pkN

1
M
#
1− k

1− 1
M
N−1$
=
N[
k=1
pkN

1
M

−

1− 1
M
N−1 N[
k=1
kpkN

1
M

= 1−

1− 1
M
N
−

1− 1
M
N−1
× N
M
,
the last line following from the expression for the mean of a binomial distribution:SN
k=1 kp
k
N (1/M) = N/M .
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Since each firm has only one job, not all matches are productive: when more
than one worker apply to one firm, only one unit of the good is produced, exactly as
if only one worker showed up. Since each firm is applied to with probability 1/M ,
the probability that a firm receives at least one application is 1− (1− 1/M)N , and
and therefore the expected number of productive matches is given by
P (N,M) =M
"
1−
µ
1− 1
M
¶N#
,
which corresponds to the number of matches in the standard directed search model
without labor hoarding.17
Payoﬀs in the Limiting Case. If we denote by b the ratio of workers to firm,
i.e., b ≡ N/M , and we let N go to infinity, the contract posted w∗∞,b in this case
has all firms oﬀering the wage
w∗∞,b ≡ limN→∞
µ
1− b
N
¶N−1
= e−b.
Hence, the expected utility enjoyed by workers and the level of expected profit for
firms are then
U∗∞,b = u(e
−b) and Π∗∞,b = 1− e−b − be−b.
Free-Entry. Since Π∗N,M > Π
∗
N,M+1 for all M ≥ 2,18 it is straightforward to
endogenize the number of active firms by assuming that there is a large number of
inactive firms and that there is a fixed cost c for a firm to become active. Then,
assuming free-entry, M(N ; c), the number of active firms when there are N < ∞
workers in the economy and the cost of entry is c, is such that
Π∗N,M ≥ c and Π∗N,M+1 < c. (19)
It is straightforward, although a bit tedious, to show that M(N ; c) is weakly de-
creasing with the set-up cost c and weakly increasing in the number of workers N .
In the limiting case, the free-entry condition determines the ratio of workers to firm
b(∞; c), which solves
1− e−b − be−b = c. (20)
It is clear that as the cost of becoming active for a firm increases the ratio of workers
to firm increases.
17See for instance Burdett et al. (2001).
18 If M = 1 the equilibrium wage is determined diﬀerently from the above anlaysis: the unique
firm in the economy does not face any competition and will therefore oﬀer 0 as a wage.
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5 Welfare Impact of Labor Hoarding Contracts
5.1 Exogenous Number of Firms
Comparison of Payoﬀs. We have shown that when firms are allowed to post
general contracts, and we focus on FWC, they post contracts that fully insure risk-
averse workers against unemployment risk. These contracts enable each firm to
minimize its wage bill, given the level of utility that is oﬀered by other firms. One
could be tempted to conclude that without restriction on contract postings firms
are therefore better oﬀ than in the standard directed model with one vacancy, and
that workers are no worse oﬀ. Although it is true that workers are no worse oﬀ,
they are in eﬀect strictly better oﬀ, firms are actually worse oﬀ.
In the standard directed search model where firms are restricted to post one
vacancy, in the symmetric equilibrium, w∗N,M [1], the wage posted by all firms is
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w∗N,M [1] =
(1− 1/M)N−1
ΩN,M(1/M ; 1) + ΛN,M (1)
, (21)
where
ΛN,M (v) = −
∙γ(w∗N,M [v])
M − 1 −
1
M
¸
∂ΩN,M (θ; v)
∂θ
¯¯¯¯
θ=1/M
> 0, (22)
with20
γ(w) ≡ u(w)
w × u0(w) ≥ 1,with strict inequality for u strictly concave. (23)
19The proof can be found in the appendix. Although it is not possible in general to obtain a
closed-form expression for the wage, if u is of the CRRA kind with u(w) = w1−σ/(1−σ), we obtain
that the expression for the equilibrium wage in the text simplifies to:
w∗N,M [1] =
(1− 1/M)N−1
ΩN,M (1/M ; 1)−

σ(M−1)+1
M−1

θ ∂ΩN,M (θ;v)∂θ

θ=1/M
.
20This is because for all x ≥ 0
u(x) = u(0) +
] x
0
u0(y)dy.
Since u(0) = 0 and for u concave u0(x) ≤ u0(y) for all y < x, with strict inequality if u strictly
concave, we have
u(x) ≥
] x
0
u0(x)dy = u0(x)x,
again with strict inequality if u strictly concave.
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Thus, the expected utility for workers in the one-vacancy directed search model is
U∗N,M [1] = ΩN,M (1/M ; 1)× u
∙
(1− 1/M)N−1
ΩN,M (1/M ; 1) + ΛN,M (1)
¸
, (24)
whereas in the symmetric FWC-equilibrium described above workers (expected)
utility is given by (17). It is clear that U∗N,M [N ] > U
∗
N,M [1]. Moreover, firms’
expected profits in the standard directed search equilibrium is given by
Π∗N,M [1] = 1−
µ
1− 1
M
¶N
− ΩN,M (1/M ; 1)
ΩN,M (1/M ; 1) + ΛN,M (1)
N
M
µ
1− 1
M
¶N−1
, (25)
whereas in the symmetric FWC-equilibrium expected profits are given by (18), which
is strictly less than Π∗N,M [1].
Analysis. It might seem surprising that firms are worse oﬀ when oﬀering labor
hoarding contracts to risk-averse workers since such contracts can presumably lower
the expected wage bill a firm has to pay because of the risk-premium firms are
implicitly levying on workers’ wages. However, there is another force at play here,
which is the greater competition among firms when labor hoarding contracts are
posted. The insurance element enables a firm, taking as given the contract posted
by other firms, to decrease its wage bill compared to the standard directed search
model by insuring risk-averse workers. But when all firms do the same, workers are
guaranteed employment by all firms, which stiﬀens competition, thereby reducing
firms’ expected profits. From our above calculations it is clear that in the present
case the competition eﬀect dominates the insurance eﬀect.
We can actually be more precise. In the FWC-equilibrium workers are getting
paid their expected marginal product, and in that sense the equilibrium outcome is
the outcome of a perfectly competitive environment. In fact, when a worker applies
to a firm, with probability 1− (1− 1/M)N−1 at least one of the N−1 other workers
has applied to that same firm, which means the firm is able to produce without the
extra worker, and therefore his marginal productivity is 0. But with probability
(1− 1/M)N−1 no other worker has applied to the firm, in which case the worker’s
marginal product is 1. In total we therefore obtain that, given that all workers apply
to each firm with probability 1/M , a worker’s expected marginal product is"
1−
µ
1− 1
M
¶N−1#
× 0 +
µ
1− 1
M
¶N−1
× 1 = w∗N,M [N ].
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However, when firms do not post hoarding contracts the outcome then fails to be per-
fectly competitive. To understand better the forces at work, consider the following:
Assume that all firms are restricted to post FWCs with the same number of vacancy
v. It can be shown (see lemma B1 in the appendix) that for any v ∈ {1, ..., N}, the
unique symmetric equilibrium is such that all firms post the FWC with wage
w∗N,M [v] =
(1− 1/M)N−1
ΩN,M (1/M ; v) + ΛN,M (v)
, (26)
where ΩN,M and ΛN,M are defined as before, and the expressions for expected utility
and expected profits are still valid but with v ∈ {1, ...,N}. If we define by W ∗N,M [v]
the expected wage, i.e., W ∗N,M [v] ≡ ΩN,M (1/M ; v)w∗N,M [v], we have that21
∆W ∗N,M [v] = − [1 + (γ(w)− 1)M ] ε(eU/θ), (27)
where
∆W ∗N,M [v] ≡
W ∗N,M [N ]−W ∗N,M [v]
W ∗N,M [v]
, and ε(eU/θ) = −∂ eU
∂θ
θeU
is the elasticity of the expected utility of applying to a firm j with respect to the
probability θ with which workers apply to another firm m.
When workers are risk-neutral, in which case workers are indiﬀerent between
receiving the wage W ∗N,M [v] for sure or receiving the wage w
∗
N,M [v] with probability
ΩN,M (1/M ; v), since γ(w) = 1, (27) simplifies to
∆W ∗N,M [v] = −ε(eU/θ), (27b)
which is positive since ∂ eU/∂θ is positive. As was highlighted earlier, one can think
of a firm’s posting decision problem when it posts a FWC with a given number
of vacancies as either choosing the wage to post or choosing the probability with
which it wants workers to apply. Hence, (27b) indicates that the greater ε(eU/θ) is
(in absolute value), that is the greater the impact of a firm’s posting decision on the
expected utility of applying to other firms, the more the equilibrium expected wage
will deviate from the perfectly competitive wage. This is actually quite intuitive:
when a firm posts a FWC with v < N vacancies, and it decreases the wage it pays,
the firm becomes less attractive to workers, which implies that θ must decrease. This
in turn implies that workers apply to other firms with a greater probability, thereby
21This is because ε(hU/θ) = −ε(U/θ)/(M − 1) in an interior solution.
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decreasing the expected utility of applying to them. Hence, not only do we have
that because of the coordination frictions a firm has some pricing (or monopoly)
power in setting its wage, we also have that when a firm decreases its wage the fall
in θ, which we can interpret as a fall in labor supply, is limited by the fact that it
becomes harder to be employed at other firms.
There are two instances in which firms do not have any pricing power, when all
firms post N vacancies and when the economy is large. In the first case, all firms
guarantee employment to all workers, so that if a firm decides to change its wage,
this has no impact on the expected utility of applying to other firms since it does
not depend on the probability with which workers apply. When the economy is
large, a firm is too small to have any impact on the queue length at other firms,
and therefore a firm cannot have any impact on the expected utility of applying to
other firms either. In fact, we have that, fixing the ratio of firms to workers to b,
(22) can be re-expressed as
ΛN,M (v) =
N
h
γ(w∗N,M [v])− 1
i
+ b
(N − b) b × v
NX
k=v+1
pkN(1/M), (22b)
and since γ(w) = 1 for all w when workers are risk-neutral,
lim
N→∞
ΛN,M (v) = lim
N→∞
1
(N − b) ×
NX
k=v+1
Pk(b) = 0,
where Pk(b) is the Poisson probability e−b ¡bk/k!¢. Hence, we have that when work-
ers are risk-neutral their expected wage W ∗θ,b[v] = Ωθ,b(b; v)w
∗
θ,b[v] is equal to their
expected marginal product e−b.
When workers are risk-averse although it is still true that the wage paid is the
competitive wage in the FWC-equilibrium characterized in proposition 2, it is no
longer true that this is also the case in a large economy when firms do not post
FWCs with N vacancies. Assuming that γ(w) is bounded for all w,22 we obtain
from (22b) that
Λ∞,b(v) = lim
N→∞
ΛN,M (v) =
γ(w∗∞,b[v])− 1
b
×
NX
k=v+1
Pk(b) > 0,
22This is true for CRRA utility functions: if u(w) = w1−σ/(1 − σ), then γ(w) = 1/(1 − σ) for
all w. For a CARA utility function u(w) = 1 − e−σw, γ(w) =

1− e−σw

/σwe−σw; and from
expression (?) giving the equilibrium value for the wage, it must be that γ(w) is finite. In fact, as
γ(w)→∞, w→ 0. But

1− e−σw

/σwe−σw → 1 as w→ 0.
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which implies that
W ∗∞,b[v] =
Ω∞,b(b; v)e−b
Ω∞,b(b; v) + Λ∞,b(v)
< e−b, for all v <∞.
The reason for this diﬀerence between the perfectly competitive expected wage and
the expected marginal product comes from the fact that, although a firm does not
have any impact on the expected utility of applying to other firms, when it de-
creases its wage in a FWC with v < N vacancies, it becomes less attractive to
workers, which in turn decreases its queue length. The shorter queue length means
that the probability of being employed, conditional on having applied to the firm,
increases. When workers are risk-averse, they are willing to accept a larger decrease
in their wage than risk-neutral workers would, because they value the probability of
being employed relative to the wage if employed more than risk-neutral workers do.
And since the weight workers put on the probability of being employed relative to
the wage paid if employed is greater than that of a risk-neutral firm, firms can oﬀer
workers contracts that oﬀer them an expected wage lower than their expected mar-
ginal product. Although we have not been able to show it analytically, numerical
results show that W ∗∞,b[v] increases with v, suggesting that as the number of vacan-
cies increases, since worker are employed in equilibrium with a greater probability,
the pricing power firms decreases. Once again this is intuitive: As the probability
of being employed increases workers are more sensitive to changes in wages.
Note that even if we had Λ∞,b(v) = 0 for all v, so that W ∗∞,b[v] = e
−b for all v,
the expected utility of workers would then be
U∗∞,b[v] = Ω∞,b(b; v)u
µ
e−b
Ω∞,b(b; v)
¶
< U∗∞,b[∞], for all v <∞.
This is because when v < N , although the expected wage oﬀered by firms is equal
to workers’ expected marginal product, workers are not guaranteed employment.
Hence, the existence of the risk of being unemployed reduces the level of welfare for
workers compared to the case where v = N . As the number v of vacancies posted by
firms increases, Ω∞,b(b; v) increases, so that workers’ expected utility would increase
as well.
5.2 Endogenous Number of Firms
In the finite economy case, although the welfare gains for workers are clear when
there is a fixed number of firms in the economy, when the number of active firms
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is determined endogenously, it is in general not possible to say whether workers
benefit from firms posting contracts that insure them completely against the risk of
unemployment. The reason lies in the fact that for a given number of firmsM , when
firms are not restricted in the type of contracts they can post, their expected profits
are lower than with standard one-vacancy contracts. Hence, when the number of
active firms is determined endogenously through free-entry, less firms will be active
with hoarding contracts than with one-vacancy contracts. In fact, M(N ; v), the
number of active firms when there are N workers in the economy and when all firms
post FWC with v vacancies, is such that
Π∗N,M [v] ≥ c and Π∗N,M+1[v] < c,
where
Π∗N,M [v] = 1−
µ
1− 1
M
¶N
− ΩN,M (1/M ; v)
ΩN,M (1/M ; v) + ΛN,M (v)
N
M
µ
1− 1
M
¶N−1
.
We know that since ΛN,M (v) > 0 for all v < N and ΛN,M (N) = 0, Π∗N,M [N ] <
Π∗N,M [1] for all M , and therefore M(N ;N) ≤ M(N ; 1). This implies a firm is
less likely to fail to fill its vacancy with standard one-vacancy contracts than with
hoarding contracts.
The lower number of active firms reduces competition, for the same number of
vacancy, and therefore the wage oﬀered by firms is such that
w∗N,M(N ;N)[N ] =
µ
1− 1
M(N ;N)
¶N−1
<
µ
1− 1
M(N ; 1)
¶N−1
.
And therefore it is not possible to say whether the expected wage W ∗N,M(N ;N)[N ] =
w∗N,M(N ;N)[N ] is greater than the expected wage when firms post standard one-
vacancy contracts
W ∗N,M(N ;1)[1] =
ΩN,M (1/M ; 1)
ΩN,M (1/M ; 1) + ΛN,M (1)
µ
1− 1
M(N ; 1)
¶N−1
,
or how the expected utility levels compare.
6 Eﬃciency Properties of the Equilibrium
7 Conclusion
We have shown that in a directed search model of the labor market with risk-averse
workers, when firms are free to oﬀer the contract they want, and in particular are
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allowed to hoard labor, firms will indeed choose to oﬀer labor hoarding contracts.
This implies that the simple wage posting contract assumed in the current litera-
ture is not a contract firms would choose to post, and therefore the equilibrium of
standard models is not robust to the introduction of risk-aversion.
It should be noted that the case considered in this paper is extreme in that
workers do not value leisure and there is no unemployment insurance payout, im-
plying that workers are indiﬀerent between working at a zero wage and not working.
This in turns puts no lower bound on the wage firms can oﬀer. This is crucial to
obtain the full-insurance result of this paper: It is clear that if we were to modify
the model in such a way that the reservation wage of workers were to be strictly
positive, and exceed the wage oﬀered by firms in the full insurance contracts, then
firms could no longer oﬀer contracts that fully insure workers against the risk of
unemployment, although they would still oﬀer labor hoarding contracts. There are
several, non-mutually exclusive, instances in which the reservation wage of workers
can be strictly positive: workers value leisure; unemployed workers receive Unem-
ployment Insurance (UI) benefits; the game is a repeated game so that workers who
do not secure a job at a given point in time can look for a job later on; workers are
allowed to send multiple applications.23
There are a number interesting applications of the directed search model with
labor hoarding contracts when firms do not oﬀer contracts that fully insure workers
against unemployment. One of them is its implications for the design of an optimal
unemployment benefit scheme. Our brief analysis above clearly indicates that the
level of UI payments, and more generally the design of a UI scheme, has an impact
on the contracts firms oﬀer to workers. And in particular it suggests that with more
generous UI payments firms would insure workers against unemployment to a lesser
extent. Hence, when designing a UI scheme it is important to take into account the
impact a UI scheme will have on firms’ contract oﬀering, and especially the impact
on the level of insurance firms oﬀer to workers. In fact, one wants to make sure that
a UI scheme does not merely serve as a substitute to the insurance oﬀered by firms
through labor hoarding contracts.
23 In the first two cases the reservation wage is exogenous, whereas it is endogenous in the two
latter.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) The proof of the first part of the proposition is a standard fixed-point prob-
lem. Let zm (θ) ≡ Um (w;θm) −
PM
j=1 θjUj (w;θj) as the excess expected utility of
applying to firm m over the mixed strategy application strategy θ, and let
Tm(θ) ≡
θm +max{0; zm (θ)}
1 +
PM
j=1max{0; zj (θ)}
.
It is clear that because Um (w;θm) is continuous in θm, for all m, zm (θ) is also a
continuous function of θ, and therefore Tm(θ) is continuous in θ. The function T
which transform θ into (Tm(θ))Mm=1 is from S
M into SM . Hence, by Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem there exists a vector θ such that T (θ) = θ, i.e., Tm(θ)=θm for all m.
If θm = 0, it must be that Tm(θ) =0, and therefore that zm (θ) ≤ 0.
If θm > 0, there are two cases to consider, whether the denominator is equal to or
greater than 1. If it is equal to 1, it follows that zm (θ) ≤ 0. If, however, the denom-
inator is equal to α > 1, we then have that θm = αθm + αmax{0; zm (θ)}, which is
equivalent to (1− α) θmzm (θ) = αmax{0; zm (θ)}zm (θ). However,
PM
m=1 θmzm (θ) =
0. Therefore
PM
m=1 (1− α) θmzm (θ) =
PM
m=1 αmax{0; zm (θ)}zm (θ) = 0, imply-
ing that zm (θ) ≤ 0 for all m. But since
PM
m=1 θmzm (θ) = 0, we have that the fixed-
point θ has the following properties: if θm > 0, then zm (θ) = 0 and if θm = 0, then
zm (θ) ≤ 0, which is consistent with an equilibrium application strategy. Therefore,
there exists an Nash equilibrium in symmetric strategies.
(ii) First, suppose that for all firms m, ue(wkm) ≥ ue(wk+1m ) for all k, with
ue(wkm) > ue(wk+1m ) for some k. Suppose that there exist two equilibrium applica-
tion strategy profiles θ and eθ. Then there exist m and j such that eθm > θm ≥ 0
and 0 ≤ eθj < θj . However, since in this case U (θ; v) is strictly decreasing in θ for
all firms, this implies that Uj(w;eθ) > Uj(w;θ). But since θj > 0, it must be true
that Uj(w;θ) ≥ Um (w;θ). And eθm > θm implies that Um (w;θ) > Um(w;eθ). In
total we obtain that Uj(w;eθ) > Um(w;eθ), which contradicts the fact that eθm > 0.
Now suppose that for all firms m 6= j for some j, ue(wkm) ≥ ue(wk+1m ) for all
k, with ue(wkm) > ue(wk+1m ) for some k, and ue(wkj ) = u
e(wk+1j ) for all k, and
suppose that there exist two equilibrium application strategy profiles θ and eθ. Ifeθj = θj = 0, then we can use the argument above to show it must be that θ = eθ.
If either eθj or θj is strictly positive, we have two cases to consider. (a) If θ and eθ
are such that 0 ≤ eθm < θm and eθi > θi ≥ 0 for some m and i: If θj > 0, one must
29
have Um(w;eθ) > Um (w;θ) = Uj (w;θ) ≥ Ui (w;θ) > Ui(w;eθ), contradicting the
fact that eθi > 0; and if eθj > 0, one must have Ui (w;θ) > Ui(w;eθ) = Uj(w;eθ) ≥
Um(w;eθ) > Um (w;θ), contradicting the fact that θm > 0. (b) If instead θ and eθ
are such that 0 ≤ eθm < θm for some m and that eθi = θi ≥ 0 for all i 6= j,m, the
fact that 0 ≤ eθm < θm for some m and that eθi = θi ≥ 0 for all i 6= j,m implies thateθj > θj ≥ 0. Since θm > 0, it must be that Uj (w;θ) ≤ Um (w;θ). Assume thus
that Uj (w;θ) = Um (w;θ). Then Uj (w;θ) < Um(w;eθ), contradicting the fact thateθj > 0. If instead Uj (w;θ) < Um (w;θ), then it must be that θm = 0, contradicting
the fact that θm > eθm ≥ 0.
If more than one firm post contracts such that ue(wkm) = ue(wk+1m ) = ue(wm) for
all k, then only the firms oﬀering the highest ue(wm) are applied to in equilibrium,
and therefore all other firms with postings such that for all k ue(wkm) = ue(wk+1m ) <
maxj ue(wj) can be ignored. By anonymity all firms posting these contracts, and
that are applied to with positive probability are applied to with the same probability,
and one can therefore follow the above argument to show uniqueness of equilibrium.¥
Proof of Lemma 2
Since w−m is such that for all firms j 6= m, ue(wkj ) ≥ (≤)ue(wk+1j ) for all
k, with ue(wkj ) > (<)u
e(wk+1j ) for some k, if there is multiplicity of equilibria of
the application subgame, we know from proposition 1 the multiplicity is due to
the contract posted by firm m. If we first assume that for a given contract profile
w−m there is a unique symmetric equilibrium application profile when firm m posts
wm, then we can use the same line of argument as used in the proof of lemma 1
to show that the firm can reduce its wage bill for a given level of expected utility
promised to the workers by posting instead a FWC wm = wm · 1N,N (N) such that
um(wm) =
PN−1
k=0 p
k
N−1(θm)u
e
m(w
k
m). In fact, we know from lemma 1 that a firm’s
optimal contract is such that all workers who have applied to the firm must be paid
the same wage, i.e., wr,km = wkm for all r ≤ k, all k. Hence, the expected wage bill in
this case is
W (wm) =
NX
k=1
pkN(θm)kwm =
NX
k=1
pkN (θm)ku
−1
"
NX
k=1
pkN(θm)u
e
m(w
k
m)
#
,
where uem(wkm) = u(wkm). However,
NX
k=1
pkN (θm)ku
−1
"
NX
k=1
pkN(θm)u(w
k
m)
#
<
NX
k=1
pkN(θm)kw
k
m
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for all wm such that wkm 6= wk0m for some k, k0. Hence, for all wm such that wkm 6= wk0m
for some k, k0 andwm = wm·1N,N (N) such that um(wm) =
PN−1
k=0 p
k
N−1(θm)u
e
m(w
k
m),
W (wm) < W (wm) implying that Π(wm; θm) > Π(wm; θm).
If there are more than one equilibrium application strategy profile when firm
m posts a non-flat wage wm, let us denote by θ1, ..., θL the L > 1 profiles. In
this case, firm m can choose to post the contract wm = wm · 1N,N (N) such that
wm = argmaxs=1,...L.Π(wsm; θ
s
m), where for all s wsm = wsm · 1N,N (N) such that
um(wsm) =
PN−1
k=0 p
k
N−1(θ
s
m)uem(wkm). In fact, given the properties of w−m, by post-
ing a FWC firm m induces a unique equilibrium of the application subgame among
the L profiles θ1, ..., θL. And for each FWC posting associated with each applica-
tion probability θsm, we have that
PN
k=1 p
k(θsm)kwsm <
PN
k=1 p
k(θsm)kwkm. Hence,
for all wm such that wkm 6= wk0m for some k, k0 and wm = wm · 1N,N (N) such that
um(wm) =
PN−1
k=0 p
k
N−1(θm)u
e
m(w
k
m), Π(wm) > Π(wm).¥
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i-a) Assume there exists an equilibrium such that all firms post the same FWC
w(N) = w · 1N,N (N) with w 6= w∗N,M [N ]. A firm’s expected profits if it posts the
contract w(N), and if it could choose the probability with which workers will apply,
is
Π(w(N); θ) = 1− (1− θ)N −Nθw.
We have that
∂Π(w(N); θ)
∂θ
= N(1−θ)N−1−Nw, and ∂
2Π(w(N); θ)
∂θ2
= −N(N−1)(1−θ)N−2 < 0 for N > 2.
Hence, given what other firms post, if a firm could choose the probability with which
workers apply, it would choose
θ∗(w) = 1− w1/(N−1). (A1)
In fact, if the firm chooses θ = 0 then it makes zero expected profits; if it chooses
θ = 1 then it needs to post a wage strictly greater than w, which then implies its
profits are strictly less than 1−Nw, whereas if it chooses θ∗(w) then its profit is
Π(w(N); θ∗(w)) = 1−Nw + (N − 1)wN/(N−1) > 1−Nw.
If θ∗(w) 6= 1/M , it means that a firm has a profitable deviation by posting an
almost-FWC that replicates the contract w(N):
w =
(
w, such that u(w) = (w) +  if k < N workers apply;
w, such that u(w) = u(w)− δ otherwise,
(A2)
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for  > 0 and δ > 0 arbitrarily small.  and δ must be such that
(1− θ∗(w))N−1 [u(w) + ] + (1− (1− θ∗(w))N−1) [u(w)− δ] = u(w),
and therefore one must have
δ () =
(1− θ∗(w))N−1
1− (1− θ∗(w))N−1 . (A3)
This implies that the extra cost of this almost-FWC compared to the FWC with N
vacancies with wage w is
C(θ∗(w); ) = Nθ∗(w)(1− θ∗(w))N−1
©
u−1[u(w) + ]− w
ª
+ (A4)
Nθ∗(w)(1− (1− θ∗(w))N−1)
©
u−1 [u(w)− δ ()]− w
ª
.
For any ∆ > 0 one can find an (θ∗(w);∆) > 0 such that C(θ∗(w);∆) < ∆: choose
(θ∗(w);∆) = u
∙
u(w) +
∆
Nθ∗(w)(1− θ∗(w))N−1
¸
− u(w). (A5)
We then have
C(θ∗(w); ) = ∆+Nθ∗(w)(1− (1− θ∗(w))N−1)
©
u−1 [u(w)− δ ()]− w
ª
< ∆,
since
u−1 [u(w)− δ ()]−w] < 0.
Hence, if initially firms’ expected profit isΠ(w(N); 1/M), then we can find (θ∗(w);∆) >
0 as given in (A5) such that
Π(w(N); θ∗(w))− C(θ∗(w); ) > Π(w(N); 1/M) ≥ 0,
where C(θ∗(w); ) is given by (A4); that is, the expected profit of posting the almost-
FWC as given by (A2) is greater than posting the FWC w(N). But θ∗(w) = 1/M
if and only if
1− w1/(N−1) = 1/M ,
which means that θ∗(w) = 1/M if and only if
w = w∗N,M [N ].
Hence, firms have an profitable deviation and all firms posting the FWC w(N) 6=
w∗N,M [N ] cannot an equilibrium.
32
(i-b) If all firms post a FWC with N vacancies but with diﬀerent wages, only the
firms posting the highest wage can receive applications. Assume that J ≥ 1 of the
firms posting N vacancies can receive applications. These J firms must be posting
the same wage, and if this is a candidate equilibrium none of these J firms must
have a profitable deviation. This means that they are all applied to with probability
1/J and the common wage posted is
w∗N,J [N ] =
µ
1− 1
J
¶N−1
.
But if a firm that will not be applied to changes its posting to an almost-FWC
that replicates w∗N,J [N ], then it can make strictly positive expected profits, which
means it has a profitable deviation. A firm’s expected profits if it posts the contract
w∗N,J [N ], and if it could choose the probability with which workers will apply, is
Π(w∗N,J [N ]; θ) = 1− (1− θ)N −Nθ
µ
1− 1
J
¶N−1
.
Hence, the choice of θ is given by (A1) with w = w∗N,J [N ], which yields that the
deviant firm’s expected profit if it post an almost-FWC of the (A2) type is
Π(w∗N,J [N ]; θ
∗(w∗N,J [N ]))− C(θ∗(w∗N,J [N ]); )
= 1−N
µ
1− 1
J
¶N−1
+ (N − 1)
µ
1− 1
J
¶N
− C(θ∗(w∗N,J [N ]); ),
which simplifies to
Π(w∗N,J [N ]; θ
∗(w∗N,J [N ]))− C(θ∗(w∗N,J [N ]); )
= 1−
µ
1− 1
J
¶N
− N
Q
µ
1− 1
J
¶N−1
> 0.
Therefore the deviant firm would make strictly positive expected profits, and there-
fore the deviation to posting an almost—FWC is indeed a profitable deviation.
(ii) Assume that all firms post FWCs and that ∃j and k such that vj = N and
vk < N .
(ii-a) Assume θj > 0 for all j such that vj = N . If θk > 0 then firm k’ initial
expected profits are non-negative and it therefore has a profitable deviation that
yield strictly positive expected profit by posting either a FWC or an almost-FWC
depending on whether its desired application probability requires one or the other.
If initially θk = 0 for all k such that vk < N , then we can follow the reasoning from
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(i-b) to show that a firm not applied to initially has a profitable deviation.
(ii-b) Assume θj = 0 for all j such that vj = N . Then we can apply corollary 2 to the
truncated economy containing only firms that are applied to with strictly positive
probability to show that this cannot be an equilibrium because the best-response of
a firm m is to post a FWC with N vacancies.
(iii) If no firm post N vacancies, then we can again appeal to corollary 2 to show
that this cannot be an equilibrium.
(iv) Finally, from analysis in (i) it is clear that all firms posting the FWC with
N vacancies at wage w∗N,M [N ] and all workers applying to each firm with probability
1/M is an equilibrium. Since all other possible types of FWC-equilibria have been
ruled out in (i)-(iii), the above equilibrium is the unique FWC-equilibrium.¥
Appendix B
Proof that Γ (θ; v) increases with v
Γ (θ; v + 1)−Γ (θ; v) = 1+ (v+1)pv+1N (θ)− (v+1)
Pv+1
k=0 p
k
N (θ)+ v
Pv
k=0 p
k
N (θ),
and which simplifies to
Γ (θ; v + 1)− Γ (θ; v) = 1−
vX
k=0
pkN(θ) > 0,
for all v < N .
Proof that there is at most one solution when firms post FWCs with
one vacancy with m = 2 and n = 3.
Define a ≡ (u(w1)− u(w2)) /3, b ≡ (3u(w1) + u(w2)) /3, c ≡ (u(w1)− u(w2))
and ∆ ≡ b2 − 4ac. The two possible solutions for the application probability are
θ∗1 = (−b +
√
∆)/2a and eθ∗1 = (−b − √∆)/2a. However, in this case c = 3a so
that ∆ = b2 − 12a2. Hence, there are two solutions if only if b2 − 12a2 > 0, which
is equivalent to having either −b/2a >
√
3 or −b/2a < −
√
3. If −b/2a >
√
3,
then we have that θ∗1 = (−b +
√
∆)/2a = (−b/2a) +
p
(−b/2a)2 − 3 >
√
3 > 1. If
−b/2a < −
√
3, then eθ∗1 = −b/2a −p(−b/2a)2 − 3 < 0. In either case there is at
most one solution whose value is between zero and one.¥
Lemma 3 If firms are restricted to post FWCs with v vacancies, then there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium and it is such that the wage posted by all firms is
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given by w∗N,M [v] solvingµ
1− 1
M
¶N−1
=
Ã
1
M
∂ΩN,M (θ; v)
∂θ
¯¯¯¯
θ=1/M
+ΩN,M
µ
1
M
; v
¶!
w∗N,M [v]
− 1
M − 1
∂ΩN,M (θ; v)
∂θ
¯¯¯¯
θ=1/M
u(w∗N,M [v])
u0(w∗N,M [v])
.
Proof. Taking the FOC of the profit function Π( ew, v) with respect to ew yields
∂eθ
∂ ew
"
N(1− eθ)N−1 −N Ãeθ∂ΩN,M (eθ; v)
∂eθ +ΩN,M (eθ; v)
! ew# = NeθΩN,M (eθ; v).
In a symmetric equilibrium in the second stage game, workers must be indiﬀerent
between visiting firmm or any other firm, which implies that F = ΩN,M (eθ; v)u( ew)−
ΩN,M (θ; v)u(w) = 0. The Implicit Function Theorem then yields that
∂eθ
∂ ew = − ΩN,M (eθ; v)u0( ew)∂ΩN,M (hθ;v)
∂θ u( ew)− ∂ΩN,M (θ;v)∂θ u(w) .
Since workers apply to the other firms with probability θ = (1−eθ)/(M−1), we have
that ∂ΩN,M (θ;v)∂θ = −
∂ΩN,M (hθ;v)
∂θ
1
(M−1) . This yields that the FOC can be rewritten as
(1− eθ)N−1 = Ãeθ∂ΩN,M (eθ; v)
∂eθ +ΩN,M (eθ; v)
! ew
−
eθ
u0( ew)
"
∂ΩN,M (eθ; v)
∂θ
u( ew) + ∂ΩN,M (eθ; v)
∂θ
1
(M − 1)u(w)
#
,
which evaluated at ew = w and eθ = θ = 1/M yields Ψ(w(v)) = 0 where
Ψ(w(v)) ≡
µ
1− 1
M
¶N−1
−
Ã
1
M
∂ΩN,M (θ; v)
∂θ
¯¯¯¯
θ=1/M
+ΩN,M
µ
1
M
; v
¶!
w(v)
+
1
M − 1
∂ΩN,M (θ; v)
∂θ
¯¯¯¯
θ=1/M
u(w(v))
u0(w(v))
.
Ψ(0) = (1− 1\M)N−1 > 0 and Ψ(w(v)) is strictly decreasing since
∂Ψ(w)
∂w
= −
Ã
1
M
∂ΩN,M (θ; v)
∂θ
¯¯¯¯
θ=1/M
+ΩN,M
µ
1
M
; v
¶!
+
1
M − 1
∂ΩN,M (θ; v)
∂θ
¯¯¯¯
θ=1/M
(u0(w))2 − u(w)u00(w)
(u0(w))2
,
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is strictly negative since
∂ΩN,M (θ; v)
∂θ
=
−v(1−
Pv
k=0 p
k
N−1(θ))
Nθ2
< 0,
(u0(w))2 − u(w)u00(w)
(u0(w))2
> 0, and
θ
∂ΩN,M (θ; v)
∂θ
+ΩN,M (θ; v) =
Pv
k=0 kp
k
N−1(θ)
Nθ
> 0.
In addition,
Ψ(1) =
µ
1− 1
M
¶N−1
−
Ãµ
1− 1
M
¶N−1
+
Pv
k=2 kp
k
N−1(θ)
Nθ
!
+
1
M − 1
Ã
−v(1−
Pv
k=0 p
k
N−1(θ))
Nθ2
!
u(w(v))
u0(w(v))
,
which is strictly negative. Therefore there exists a unique w(v) ∈ (0, 1) solving
Ψ(w(v)) = 0. And given that there is a unique value of θ that makes the workers
indiﬀerent between the diﬀerent firms, this the unique possible w(v).
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